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SCHOOL SPEECH V. SCHOOL SAFETY: IN THE 
AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE ON SCHOOL CAMPUSES 
THROUGHOUT THIS NATION, How SHOULD SCHOOL 
OFFICIALS RESPOND TO THREATENING STUDENT 
EXPRESSION? 
Richard V Blystone* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment is sometimes considered a "safety 
valve." 1 Through expression, one's frustration is less likely to 
resonate. What about student expression? What should a 
teacher or principal do if they are exposed to student 
expression that suggests that a student is going to engage in 
violent behavior-a poem wherein a student discusses raping a 
classmate, a song that contains lyrics that portray a teacher's 
head being struck with a sledgehammer, or a painting that 
depicts a school decimated by an explosion? Are students who 
convey themselves in this manner simply expressing their 
artistic tendencies, joking around, or is there real cause for 
concern? 
In the wake of an epidemic of violence in this nation's 
schools, it is imperative that we discuss alternatives to the 
present approach of how schools handle potentially dangerous 
student expression. Part I of this article will address some of 
the difficulties school administrators and teachers face when 
weighing students' First Amendment freedoms against a 
school's fundamental interest m providing a secure 
'The author, J.D., 2005, Nova Southeastern University, is an associate with Moran & 
Shams, P.A., in Orlando, Florida. He would like to specially thank Professor Ronald 
Benton Brown, Assistant Professor Stephanie Aleong, and Jennifer Kopf for their 
guidance and contributions on this project. 
1. E.g. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 8:32, S:iG (D.Conn. 1970). 
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environment that is conducive to learning. Part II of this article 
addresses national statistics on school violence. Part III of this 
article addresses "leakage"-the concept that students often 
leave clues that forecast that they plan to engage in future 
violent acts. Part IV of this article addresses the true threat 
doctrine; and the author explains that upon establishing that 
student expression represents a true threat, school 
administrators can and must act quickly and decisively to 
preempt future violence, even where a student has engaged in 
otherwise protected speech. Part V of this article introduces the 
Tinker standard and its progeny, which provide an alternative 
basis for intervention against students who engage in 
threatening expression. Part VI of this article addresses due 
process concerns implicated by documenting school records, 
suspending, or expelling students who engage in threatening or 
disruptive expression. The author will then conclude by 
arguing that given the violent landscape, school teachers, 
faculty, and administrators should be given the broadest 
discretion permissible under the law to intervene when student 
speech is perceived as threatening or disruptive. 
II. THE INCIDENCE OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE 
National statistics indicate that the incidence and severity 
of school violence is something with which we should be vitally 
concerned. In 2004-2005, there were thirty-nine school-related 
violent deaths. 2 In 2001, two million nonfatal acts of school 
violence were directed at students between twelve and eighteen 
years of age; and between 1997 and 2001, teachers were the 
victims of approximately 473,000 violent crimes.:l But this is 
nothing new. In fact, a school safety survey conducted by the 
National Institute of Education in 1978 revealed that nearly 
13% of the approximately 55,000 students and teachers 
surveyed were victimized in a given month. 4 
Though the incidence of school violence has always been a 
matter of concern, the method of violence occurring in schools 
2. Nat'! Sch. Safety & Sec. Servs., School-Associal<•d lkaths: :2004-4005. http:// 
www.schoolsecurity.org/tn•nds/schooL violence04-0ii.html (last visitt•d May :10. 2007). 
3. J.F. DIWm: ET J\L., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. & U.S. lh:l'''l' OF ,JlJSTICE. NCES 2004-
004. lNIJICATOI\S OF SCHOOL CmME AND SAFETY: 200:1. at v, ix (200:l). 
4. David C. Anderson, Curriculum, Culture, and Col!l/1/.ll.nity: The Challeng·(' of 
School Violence, 24 CRIMI•: & ,JUST. iJ17, 320-21 (199/i). 
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has drastically changed. In many respects, the use of handguns 
has replaced name-calling and fist-fighting. In 1988, a 
deranged man in Stockton, California killed five children and 
injured twenty-nine others when he fired an assault rifle into a 
schoolyard. 5 In 1998, two middle school students carried out a 
deadly shooting spree at their school in Jonesboro, Arkansas, 
which left four of their peers murdered. 6 The nation wept after 
two teenagers walked into Columbine High School on April 20, 
1999 and slaughtered one teacher and twelve classmates. 7 In 
2005, a high school student went on a rampage at Red Lake 
High School in Minnesota, leaving eight more of this nation's 
youth slain.8 And as this article was being edited, Cho Seung-
Hui took the lives of at least thirty-two people on the campus of 
Virginia Tech, in what is considered the deadliest school 
shooting in United States history. 9 
Ill. LEAKAGE 
In the aftermath of occurrences such as these, the 
Department of Education, the Secret Service, and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation undertook a study of school violence to 
provide guidance in future threat assessment. 10 While no 
single perpetrator profile was identified, the FBI did confirm 
that students often left clues in the form of letters, essays, 
poems, stories, song lyrics or drawings, which for lack of a 
better term, foreshadowed their violent acts.ll The FBI 
referred to these indicia of violence as "leakage;" and reported 
that since Columbine, careful response to leakage has foiled 
fi. Id. at :n9. 
(i. See K.enneth l!c>ard, Killer's Essay Haunts Westside Teacher, ARK. DE~lOCRAT­
GAZETTE, .June G, 199~1. at AL 
7. See Troy Eid, Chief Counsel to Colorado Governor Bill Owens, Remarks at 
News Conference on the Law and the Columbine High School Shooting (Aug. 1 :i. 1999) 
(transcript available at 1999 WL (-i12147). 
H. See Mara Gottfried & Shannon Prather, 'A Deep, Deep l'ain': Community 
Griet•es for Those Lost Alter School Shooting Leat]('S 10 Drad: School Shooting Stun Red 
Lalic. GJ{_.;:-m FOHKS 111-:IL\LD. Mar. 23, 200ii, at Al. 
9. Liza l'orteus, /<(yfeml Oflicials: At Least 32 /Jcad after Virginia Tech 
Untt•ersity Shootint;. FOXNEWS.COM, Apr. 1 G, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/ 
0.29:l:l.26631 O.OO.html 
10. Sec Sarah K RcdfiPld, Threats Made, Threats }'used: School and .Judicial 
Analysis in Need of Redirection. 200:1 I3YU EllUC. & L .• J. 6fi:l, 712 (200:l). 
11. Jd. 
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several intended school killings. 12 
One legal implication of leakage is that if schools do punish 
a student for speech that is indicative of future violent or 
disruptive behavior, the student may allege that his or her 
First Amendment rights were violated. 13 In turn, 
schoolteachers and administrators often suggest that there is 
nothing they can do about student speech that concerns them 
unless and until a student or teacher is explicitly threatened. 14 
For instance, Professor Lucinda Roy of Virginia Tech relayed 
her concerns to campus police after Cho Seung-Hui "displayed 
anti-social behavior in her class and handed in disturbing 
writing assignments." 15 She later commented that authorities 
"hit a wall" in terms of what they could do since Seung-Hui had 
not made a "viable threat to himself or others." 16 One 
possibility would have been to suspend Seung-Hui after he 
turned in the disturbing writing assignment as a sort of 
"cooling off period" or so that he could be referred to a mental 
health practitioner for an evaluation. This issue then becomes 
whether a perpetrator such as Seung-Hui would have a viable 
basis to assert a First Amendment violation on the basis that 
he was suspended as a result of what he expressed. 
To withstand students' First Amendment claims, school 
boards must show one or more of the following: (1) the student 
speech constituted a "true threat"; 17 or (2) by engaging in 
threatening or disruptive speech, the student substantially or 
materially interfered with the workings of the school; 18 or that 
(3) the student speech impinged upon the rights of other 
students to be secured and let alone; 19 AND that ( 4) where 
practicable, the school board adhered to procedural guidelines 
prior to suspending or expelling the student, or documenting 
his or her permanent record. 20 
12. ld. 
1 :;. Anne Dunton Lam, Student Threats and the First Amendment, Sell. L. BULL., 
Spring 2002, at 1, 2. 




17. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). 
18. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 39:i U.S. 503, 509 (1969). 
19. ld. at 508. 
20. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572 (1975). 
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IV. TRUE THREATS 
A. When Uttered in a School Setting, True Threats Are 
Unprotected by the First Amendment 
203 
Although the First Amendment ensures that Congress 
"shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech," there 
are several classes of communication that fall outside First 
Amendment protection. 21 Some examples of unprotected 
speech include obscenity, child pornography, libel, and 
"fighting words."22 Threats of violence are also unprotected. 
This "protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence, from the 
disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that 
the threatened violence will occur."23 Perhaps nowhere is the 
need to protect individuals from threats of violence more 
necessary than on school grounds. 
1. The schoolhouse gate 
Although students do not "shed their constitutional rights 
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,"24 
the rights of school children within the school environment are 
not "automatically co-extensive with the rights of adults in 
other settings."25 Schools need not tolerate speech that is 
inconsistent with the school's educational mission,26 that is 
vulgar and offensive to the fundamental values of education, 27 
that substantially interferes with the work of the school, 28 or 
which impinges upon other students' rights. 29 Thus, there is 
certainly a basis to temper student speech in the school 
21. U.S. CO:--JST. amend. I. 
22. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (noting that 
there are certain types of speech, including expression, "which by their very utterance 
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" for which "the 
prevention and punishment ... has never been thought to raise any constitutional 
problems"). 
2:1. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992); see Watts v. United 
States. 394 U.S. 705. 707 (1969). 
24. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., :39:1 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
25. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 47/l U.S. 675, 682 (1986). 
2G. ld. at 685. 
27. ld. at 685-HG. 
2tl. See Tinker, :39:1 U.S. at 509. 
29. Id. 
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setting. 80 In fact, "[t]he concern for student safety 1s 
particularly high now in view of recent episodes of school 
violence" and ''[w]hen a school district learns of a potential 
threat by a student, it not only has a right but a duty to 
investigate the circumstances.":ll 
2. Non-arbitrary intrusion on First Amendment freedoms 
Even in the face of episodes such as Columbine and 
Virginia Tech, administrators do not have unbridled discretion 
to respond to student expression that alerts them to the 
possibility of future violence. Courts are unlikely to uphold a 
school's decision to suspend, expel, or document a student's 
permanent record unless the student speaker has 
communicated a "true threat.":12 The seminal Supreme Court 
case that established the true threat doctrine was Watts v. 
U.S. :n In Watts, the defendant was arrested during a public 
rally near the Washington Monument after he unwittingly 
statt~d to an undercover Army Intelligence Corps officer that "if 
they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in 
my sights is L.B.J.":14 On the basis of his statement, the jury 
found Watts guilty of committing a felony for "knowingly and 
willfully threatening the President" of the United States.:35 By 
a two-to-one vote, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the trial court's 
decision. 86 However, the Supreme Court reversed. 87 In 
reversing the conviction, the Court announced four factors that 
must be considered by courts in their determination of whether 
:10. See, e.g, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, :nil at 57:3 (stating that threatening 
exprc>ssion is "of such slight social value ... that any benefit derived from it is clearly 
outwl,ighed by thl• social in ten, st. in order and morality"). 
:n. Boman v. Bluestem Unified Sch. Dist. No. 205, No. 00-10:14-WEB, 2000 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 5389, at *12 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2000); see also D.G. v. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 
OO-C-lHi14-E, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12197, at *12 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 21, 2000) (arguing 
that whrether a t.rm• threat exists should be decided against the backdrop of violence in 
schools today). 
:12. In re Douglas D., 62(i N.W.2d 72Fi, 7:!9-40 (Wis. 2001); see also Watts v. U. S., 
394 U.S. 705, 70~ ( 1969); Virginia v. Black. 5:18 U.S. :14:1, :159 (200:1) (discussing the 
Watts definition of "true threat"). 




:n. Id. at 70li. 708. 
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a true threat exists. The four factors are the reaction of the 
listener, the conditional nature of the threat, the extent to 
which one's speech is mere political hyperbole, and the overall 
context and background circumstances of the expression. :JH 
B. Applying Watts to the School Setting 
The determination of what constitutes a true threat is 
arguably more complicated in a school setting than in other 
settings due to the variety of information that school officials 
have at their disposal. Factors that school officials might 
consider before acting on a perceived threat include the age 
and maturity of the student speaker, his or her past academic 
record, whether the expression was directly communicated to 
the object of the threat or some third person, whether the 
speaker intended to carry out his or her threat, other instances 
of school violence in the community, and whether the 
recipient's response to the expression was reasonable. 
However, various legal questions can arise about the extent to 
which these factors can and should be considered. 
1. The reasonableness standard 
Since Watts, courts have struggled to find a workable 
standard of the true threat doctrine, which can easily be 
applied in a school setting. For example, the Seventh Circuit 
focuses on "whether a reasonable speaker would foresee that 
the recipient of [his or her] words would take the statement 
seriously."39 Conversely, courts such as the Fourth and the 
Fifth Circuit assess whether a true threat exists according to 
how a "reasonable recipient" would view the expression.40 
Perhaps this is an illusory distinction. It appears that 
regardless of how it applies the test, each Circuit gives some 
consideration to the perspective of both the speaker and the 
recipient. Inevitably, a juror will consider both whether he 
would have feared for his personal safety under the 
circumstances, and whether he would expect someone to be 
legitimately frightened if he had uttered the same words as the 
:)H. ld. at 707-0i:l. 
:19. United States v. Saunders, 166 F.:Jd 907, 913 (7th Cir. 1991); see also United 
States v. Pacione, 950 F.~d 1:)48, 1355 (7th Cir. 1991). 
40. United State's v. Roberts, 915 F.2d 889, 891 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Daugenhaugh, 49 F.3d 171, 173-74 (5th Cir. 1971). 
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defendant. Often the most difficult aspect of applying the 
reasonableness standard to school speech, regardless of how it 
is interpreted, is determining what constitutes "reasonable" 
from the perspective of a school-aged child or adolescent. 
2. The ambiguities of intent 
It is clear that threatening expression "intentionally or 
knowingly communicated" to the object of the threat loses First 
Amendment protection. 41 Some courts have also held that 
threatening expression loses protection where it is 
communicated to a third party rather than to the object of the 
threat. For instance, in Doe v. Pulaski County Special School 
District, a middle school student drafted letters wherein he 
expressed a desire to molest, rape, and murder his ex-
girlfriend.42 The student did not give a copy of the letters to his 
ex-girlfriend. 43 However, some weeks later, the student's friend 
found one of the letters and told other students about it.44 
Eventually, the student's ex-girlfriend learned of the letter 
through a third party, became upset, and notified school 
officials.45 Her school principal recommended that the author 
of the letters be expelled for violating a school district rule that 
prohibited students from making terrorizing threats. 46 The 
Eighth Circuit held that the letters did in fact constitute a true 
threat. In making its determination, the court considered the 
issue of whether there was sufficient evidence of intent to 
communicate the threat where the author simply allowed a 
friend to read the letter, but did not give the letter to his ex-
girlfriend. The court concluded that this was sufficient because 
the author knew his friend was likely to tell the ex-girlfriend 
about the letter's content.47 
---~ -·------
41. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., No. 04-30162, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 
25550, at *15 (5th Cir. Dec. 10, 2004); Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 
F.:id 616, 624 (Rth Cir. 2002) (en bane). 
42. Id. at 619. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 620. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 624; sec also U. S. v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, s:H-32 (lOth Cir. 1986) 
(affirming conviction where defendant made statement to a third party, threatening to 
kill the President of the United States). 
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In addition to the above, the Supreme Court has held that 
the originator of the threat need not actually intend to carry 
out their threat, or have the means or ability to carry out their 
threat, in order to be prosecuted for making a threat. 48 As an 
example, in Schenck v. United States, Justice Holmes discussed 
a hypothetical involving a patron who walks into a crowded 
theater and falsely shouts, "Fire!"49 He then determined that 
falsely shouting "Fire!" in a crowded theater was not protected 
speech. 50 The basis of his determination was that it did not 
matter that the speaker had no intention to set the theater 
ablaze because by uttering the word "Fire!" he or she would 
necessarily create a clear and present danger, which would 
make the other theater patrons feel unsafe.51 
The same can be said of a student who wears a t-shirt, 
writes a poem, draws a picture, or drafts song lyrics that 
convey to another student or teacher that they should fear for 
their personal safety. Once the speaker's message is conveyed, 
whatever the form, the damage is done, especially in a closed 
setting such as a school. More than in other settings, a threat 
conveyed on a school campus can have long-lasting effects 
because at school, the recipient of the expression cannot simply 
leave the premises and is likely to run across the speaker the 
next day or sometime in the very near future. The recipient's 
only practical recourse may be to notify a teacher and hope that 
action is taken. 
3. The conditional nature of the threat 
Courts also consider the conditional nature of a threat in 
determining whether a true threat exists, and whether a school 
official has acted properly.52 By definition, something that is 
conditional is "contingent upon some event or action."53 The 
rationale behind applying this factor to true threat analyses is 
that where a speaker premises his or her threat upon the 
occurrence of some other event, the threat is less likely to 
48. Schenck v. U. S., 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 
343 (2002). 
49. Schench. 249 U.S. at 52. 
50. Id. 
51. !d. 
52. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969). 
5~1. Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & 
POL'Y 283, 340 (2001). 
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materialize. 54 As such, a conditional threat is deemed less 
likely to constitute a viable danger. 55 However, "conditionality" 
is a somewhat muddled distinction. Arguably, threats are by 
their very nature conditional. 56 Because of this, whether a 
threat is conditional can be a difficult factor for school 
administrators to interpret. 57 Imminence of a threat or the 
likelihood that a threat will be carried out is not often clearly 
defined, especially in an atmosphere involving teenagers or 
young school children. 
4. Form of the expression 
"[A] threat must be distinguished from ... constitutionally 
protected speech."58 It is impermissible to punish students for 
innocuous talk, attempts at jest, or speech that conveys mere 
political hyperbole. 59 For example, in In re Douglas D., Douglas 
D. wrote a story in his creative writing class that described a 
student cutting off his teacher's head with a machete. 60 
Douglas D. turned the story in to his teacher, who feared for 
her safety and reported the incident. 61 The state of Wisconsin 
ultimately prosecuted and convicted Douglas D. under a 
disorderly conduct law. 62 The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
overturned the Wisconsin Court of Appeals conviction on the 
grounds that the story contained "hyperbole and attempts at 
jest" and should not have been taken seriously. 63 For instance, 
Douglas D. had indicated to the court that when used in the 
poem, the title "Mrs. C" stood for the fact that his teacher was a 
"crab."64 However, in a very spirited dissent, Wisconsin 
Supreme Court Justice Prosser responded to the hyperbole and 
54. ld. at 341. 
55. See id. 
5G. Matthew G. Martin, Comment, True Threats, Militant Actiuists, and tfw First 
Amendment. 82 N.C. L. REV. 2SO, 2S5 (200:l). 
57. Sec, e.g, Hothman, supra note 5::l, at 340. 
5S. Watts v. United States, :394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969). 
59. U. 8. v. Miller, 115 F.:ld 361, 36:l (6th Cir. 1997). However, even ambiguous 
statements may he a basis for violation of a criminal-threat statute. See In re Hyan D., 
12:l Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 198 (2002) ("To constitute criminal threat, a communication 
need not be absolutely unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific."). 
60. In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, ?a0-31 (Wis. 2001). 
()1. ld.at7::ll. 
62. I d. 
6:l. ld.at741. 
64. ld. 
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jest argument by citing an incident in Winterstown, 
Pennsylvania, which occurred while In rc Douglas D. was 
pending, where a man did in fact injure nine people at school 
with a machete. 65 Justice Prosser went on to state, "Macabre 
writings may reflect a harmless fantasy life. Then again, they 
may be a true threat."66 The essence of Justice Prosser's 
dissent was that schools themselves, not courts, should be the 
ones to interpret a student's expression and determine how to 
treat it. 67 
Students, like just about anyone else, usually express 
themselves in the form with which they feel most comfortable. 
If a student is an artist who likes drawing cartoons, he or she 
may use that medium to express rage. If a student is a writer, 
he or she may draft a fictional children's story to indicate 
angst. Teachers and faculty members are in the best position to 
determine whether a true threat exists. It is they who have 
relevant knowledge of how a particular student behaves from 
day to day. 61l School officials also have the advantage of 
familiarity with a student's record, family situation, and other 
aspects of a student's life that may help them to more 
accurately interpret potentially threatening behavior. 69 School 
officials should be permitted to take expression in any form 
seriously, and to intervene, even if it is not clear from the form 
65. !d. at 7G(i (Prosser, .J., dissenting) (citing Pc>ter .Jackson. Machete Attach at 
:ichool Injures 8 Adults, (j Childrm, PlTTSBURC;H POST·G.\ZETTE. Feb. :l. 2001. at Al). 
66. !d. at 7:iH (Prosser. ,J., dissenting). 
67. !d. at 762. 
68. School administration must be afforded substantial authority to deal with 
threatening behavior. See Epperson v. Arkansas, :19:l U.S. 97. l04 (1968) ("By and 
large, public education in our Nation is committed to thP control of state and local 
authorities."); SC(' also LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 2G7 F.:ld 9Hl' mJ2 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(reviewing with dd'erencc schools' decisions in contwction with thP safety of their 
students, even when fre(,dom of expression is involved); In rc /)ouglcts D., 626 N.W.2d 
at 75S (Prossc>r, ,J., dissenting) (arguing that school disciplim• generally should remain 
the prerogative of our schools and that "the facts are best dl'tPrmim•d by fact-finders on 
the scene, not appellate judges"). In Wood u. Strickland. -!20 U.S. :lOS. :126 (1970) 
(citation omitted). the Supreme Court stated: 
Given the fact thcere was evidence supporting the charg(' against respondents. the 
contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals is improvident. lt is not the role of the 
federal courts to set asidP decisions of school administrators which the court may 
view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion. Public high school students do 
have substantive and procedural rights while at school. Rut, Section 1983 does not 
extend the right to relitigate in federal court evidentiat·y questions arising in 
school disciplinary proceedings .... 
69. See ln re Douglas IJ., 62G N.W.2d at 752-5:1 (Prosser,,)., dissenting). 
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of the expresswn that a student IS harboring true violent 
intentions. 
C. Documenting Threatening Expression 
If students are punished for engaging in threatening 
expression, one avenue of recourse is to petition a court to 
enjoin their school district from referring to the incident in 
their permanent school record. 7° Courts are likely to grant 
injunctive relief if the school is unable to show that the 
expression constituted a true threat or if the student is able to 
show that the school failed to adhere to procedural guidelines 
prior to documenting the incident. 71 But granting students 
relief such as this could have disastrous results. 
Documentation does more than deter or punish the implicated 
student; it also ensures that educators, school psychologists, 
and parents are informed that the student in question might 
have social or behavioral issues that should be addressed. 72 As 
a student advances in grade level or changes schools, a record 
of prior behavior forewarns school administrators to take any 
deviant behavior seriously. 73 If courts make a habit of 
enjoining schools from documenting student records, the result 
is that school boards, principals, and teachers will be dissuaded 
from keeping thorough records, which will only increase the 
likelihood that future indications of violence will go unnoticed. 
V. TINKER AND ITS PROGENY 
The true threat doctrine set forth in Watts provides only 
70. See Lavine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 2f>7 F.3d 981, 992 (9th Cir. 2001); Boim v. 
Fulton Co. Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A.l:05CV2836MHS, 2006 WL 21897a:l. at *2, 5 (N.D. Ga. 
2006); Ponce v. Socorro. Indep. Sch. Dist., 432 F. Supp.2d 682, 687 (W.D. Tex. 2006). 
71. See La Vine, 257 F.3d at 992 (noting that once the school had permitted the 
student to "return to classes and had satisfied itself that [the student] was not a threat 
to himself or others," the maintenance of negative documentation in the student"s file 
was no longer appropriate); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 56f>, 567, f>72 (1975) 
(affirming district court's order "enjoining the [school] administrators to remove all 
references to such suspensions from the students' records" because students "were 
temporarily suspended from their high schools without a hearing either prior to 
suspension or within a reasonable time thereafter"). 
72. See Lisa M. Pisciotta, Beyond Sticks & Stones: A First Amendment 
Framework for Educators Who Seek to Punish Student Threats. 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 
6:35. 667 (2000). 
73. /d. 
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one basis for upholding a school official's decision to punish a 
student for engaging in threatening expression. In TinJ.cer u. 
Des Moines Independent School District, the Supreme Court 
delineated another. Specifically, it held that expression that 
substantially and materially disrupts a school environment is 
also unprotected by the First Amendment. 74 To illustrate what 
constitutes a "substantial and material interference," the 
Tinker Court compared two cases from the Fifth Circuit. In 
Burnside u. Byar::;, the Fifth Circuit enjoined a high school from 
enforcing a regulation that forbade students from wearing 
"freedom buttons."75 On the same day, in Blackwell u. 
Issaquena County Board of Education, the same panel declined 
to enjoin enforcement of the same regulation at a different 
school. 76 The difference was that the school board in Blackwell 
showed that the students wearing freedom buttons caused a 
disturbance in the school by harassing students who chose not 
to wear the buttons. 77 The showing of harassment was the 
key. 78 Drawing the Tinker holding out to its logical conclusion, 
it appears that expression that targets a person or group of 
persons, as opposed to open-ended statements against society, 
for instance, is more likely to cause a punishable substantial or 
material disruption. 79 
A. The Practical Erosion of the Tinker Standard 
As courts started to apply Tinker, it became clear that 
additional guidance was needed. In La Vine u. Blaine School 
District, the Ninth Circuit provided some much needed latitude 
to school officials. James La Vine, an eleventh grade student, 
wrote a poem entitled "Last Words," which involved his 
examination of the thought processes of a student who murders 
his classmates. 80 The poem read in pertinent part as follows: 
71. :393 U.S. 50:1, 505 (1969); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 181 U.S. 260, 
266 (19H8). 
75. 363 F.2d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1966). 
76. :363 F. 2d 749, 750 (5th Cir. 1966) (Freedom buttons depicted a black and 
white hand joined together and the word "SNCC," which stood for Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee). 
77. ld. at 753--54. 
7H. See id. 
79. La Vine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F. :3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Karp 
v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 175 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
HO. ld. at 9H:1. 
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I pulled my gun, from its case, and began to load it. I 
remember, thinking at least I won't, go alone, as L jumpped 
[sic) in, the car, all I could think about, was I would not, go 
alone. As I walked, through the, now empty halls, 1 could feel, 
my hart [sic] pounding. As I approached, the classroom door, I 
drew my gun and, threw open the door, Bang, Bang, Bang-
Bang. When it was all over, 28, were, dead .... 81 
The Ninth Circuit held that the Blaine School District did 
not violate La Vine's First Amendment rights when it expelled 
him on an emergency basis after La Vine showed his teacher 
the poem. 82 It concluded that it was sufficient that the poem 
contained images of violent death, suicide, and the shooting of 
fellow students. 8:1 The principal of James La Vine's school had 
appropriately considered La Vine's "suicidal ideations, 
disciplinary history, family situation, recent break-up with his 
girlfriend," and a recent school shooting in a nearby city before 
deciding to expel him. 84 In essence, the Lavine court adopted a 
"totality of the circumstances" approach for evaluation of 
schools' decisions and stated specifically that school officials 
should not be required to wait until disruption occurs before 
they may act. 85 
One cannot help but wonder what would have happened if 
the "totality of the circumstances test" was applied in the cases 
of Columbine or Virginia Tech. That said, the test has been met 
with some criticism. 86 The argument is that allowing school 
authorities to use the totality of the circumstances approach 
81. Jd. 
H~. !d. at 992. 
S'' 
"· 
Id. at 9>10. 
84. ld. at 991. 
SG. ld. at 91l9 90 ("Whl'n the school officials madl> their d<>cision not to allow 
[stuckntj to attend class on Monday morning, they Wl'l't' aware of a substantial number 
of facts that in isolation would probahl~· not have warranted their response>, but in 
combination gan' them a rea,.;onable basis for their actions."): see ulso In rc A.S .. 626 
N.W.2d 712, 720 (Wis. 2001) (schools can forecast the> likelihood of disruption based 
upon past experi"nce in the school, curn,nt events influencing st.U<k,nt activitir>s and 
behavior, and other instances of actual or· threatl'tH'd disruption relating to the 
exprPssion in qul•stion). 
SG. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 279 F.:ld 719, 72,1 (9th Cir. 2002) (Klc,infelcl. ,J., 
dissenting) ("ThP panel decision creates a nl'W First Amendment rule: when• school 
officials perceive a major social concern about school safdy, tlwy may punish school 
childn'n whose speech gives ri,.;e to a concern that they may he clangl>rous to 
themselvc>s or otlwrs. even though the spl,ech is not a threat, disruptive. defamatory, 
sexuaL or otherwise within any previously recognizl'd category of constitutionally 
unprotected speech."). 
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provides them with too much power. For instance, some 
scholars are concerned with the fact that school officials might 
abuse their discretion by manufacturing a set of circumstances 
that would somehow warrant the imposition of a punishment 
against a student who, for example, hands in a suspicious 
writing assignment, which could arbitrarily encroach upon that 
student's First Amendment rights. 87 However, given that 
students are dying at alarming rates in egregious fashion, it 
does not appear that faculty members have the luxury of 
waiting to act. To put it another way, the damage one 
overzealous principal could do is certainly outweighed by the 
havoc left by one student gunman. 
B. Students' Right to Education Should Not Be Obstructed 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed its concern 
over the right of students "to be secure and to be let alone" and 
to be given the freedom and ability to learn.H8 In Keyishian v. 
Board of Regents, it held that "students must always remain 
free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity 
and understanding."i'l9 Justice Brennan spoke of a student's 
right to learn as being an integral part of the educational 
system. 90 Justice Fortas stated that these rights are held by 
the student and are not to be impinged upon by other 
students. 91 In Ambach v. Norwick, Justice Powell stressed the 
importance of public schools in preparing children for 
"participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values" 
of a democratic system. 92 And in Board of Education v. Pica, 
Justice Brennan noted that there is a substantial community 
interest in the promotion of respect for authority and for 
traditional social, moral, and political values, and this interest 
is best represented by the school board in their capacity to 
teach and discipline students. 93 
87. David L. Hudson. Fear of Violence in our Schools: Is "Undifferentiated Fear" 
in the Age of Columbine Leading to a Suppression of Student Speech?, 42 W ASHBUI{N 
L .• J. 79. 80 81 (2002). 
8S. !d. at 508. 
89. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, :l85 U.S. 5S9, 60:3 (1967) (quoting Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, :354 U.S. 234. 250 (1957)). 
90. !d. 
91. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist .. :39:3 U.S. 50:i, 509 (1969). 
92. Ambach v. Norwick. 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979). 
9:i. Bd. of Educ. v. l'ico, 457 U.S. 85.3. 864 (1982). 
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If handled appropriately, school administrators' response to 
expression that impinges upon the rights of other students will 
illustrate to students that interference with the school's most 
basic values will not be tolerated. This necessarily reinforces 
the ideal that students must consider what they say in the 
context of their environment and the listeners who may be 
affected. To that end, courts should give their "full support and 
approval to the actions of school administrators who take 
appropriate action to protect and educate their students in a 
disciplined environment that is safe and conducive for 
learning."94 
VI. DUE PROCESS CONCERNS 
The right to a public education is a property interest 
protected by the Due Process Clause and may not be taken 
away as a result of a student's misconduct without providing 
minimal procedural safeguards.95 Accordingly, school officials 
are subject to due process claims if they fail to put procedural 
safeguards in place. Adequate process requires at a minimum 
that students facing suspension for engaging in threatening or 
disruptive expression be given some kind of notice and afforded 
a hearing. 96 Notice and opportunity to be heard should 
generally occur prior to the student's removal from school. 97 In 
cases where prior notice and a hearing are not practicable or 
feasible, the removed student should be given notice of a 
hearing as soon as possible. 98 
VII. CONCLUSION 
"The first job of law is to provide freedom from violence and 
the fear of violence that kills civilization at its roots."99 The 
mere "discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany 
an unpopular viewpoint" are not sufficiently disruptive to 
constitute a substantial interference, but true threats of 
94. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 301 F. Supp. 2d 576, 589 (D. La. 2004). 
95. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). 
96. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 579 (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Trust Co., :i:19 
U.S. :106. :11 :l (1950)). 
97. Id. at 582-S:l. 
98. !d. 
99. ALFI{ED H. KNH;HT. TilE LIFE OF THE LAW 4 (1996). 
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violence, material disruption, or speech that impinges upon the 
rights of other students strike at the heart of basic educational 
tenets. 100 To deny school authorities the broadest discretion 
possible to intervene against a student who engages in 
threatening or disruptive expression is not only dangerous, but 
it is also reasonably likely to cause more lawsuits. With no 
clear indication in the law that school administrators have the 
broadest discretion available to them, punished students are 
more likely to sue their local school board on the basis that 
their First Amendment rights were violated. 
More lawsuits, however, will not improve the environment 
in today's schools. 101 As Chief Judge Wilkinson of the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has noted, educators should be 
freed from the burden of litigation and provided with a greater 
role in the administration of their schools. 102 Adolescents are 
still learning responsibility, civility, and maturity, and 
consequently, need to grow into their constitutional rights. 10:3 
Students like Columbine killer Eric Harris, who declared on his 
web site, "I am the law. If you don't like it, you die," 104 and Cho 
Seung-Hui, who stated in his media manifesto, "Oh the fun I 
could have had mingling among you hedonists, being counted 
as one of you, if only you didn't [expletive] the living [expletive] 
out of me,"105 "fail to realize that "responsibilities go hand in 
hand with rights, and the former must be learned before the 
latter can ever be enjoyed."106 
Schools are charged in large part with instilling the values 
that Judge Wilkinson described. 107 They must also be 
concerned with the responsibility of keeping children safe while 
on school grounds, during school hours. To undertake these 
responsibilities, the First Amendment should take a back seat 
while teachers and administrators are given the broadest 
100. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 50:i, 509 (1969); see Watts v. 
United States, :-l94 U.S. at70H. 
101. See Chief .Judge .J. Harvie Wilkinson, United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, Remarks at News Conference on the Law and the Columbine High 
School Shooting (Aug. J:l, 1999) (transcript available at 1999 WL 612147). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. See Eid, supra note 7. 
105. Manifesto, Cho Seung-Hui (Apr. 16, 2007), available at 
http://www .msnbc.msn.com/id/18186053/. 
106. See Wilkinson, supra note 101. 
107. Id. 
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discretion permissible under the law to discipline students and 
document their behavior. Frankly, this also means that courts 
should be removed from the disciplinary process whenever 
possible. Teachers and school administrators are in the best 
position to make these determinations. After all, if the 
alternative to giving schools more discretion is that more school 
children will be lost to violence, we really don't have a choice! 
